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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 William Henry Flamer, whose first-degree murder 
conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, took this appeal from an order of the district 
court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  When 
Flamer's appeal was initially presented to this panel, he argued: 
(1) that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments and therefore should have been suppressed; 
(2) that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective; (3) 
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that the penalty-phase jury instructions violated the Eighth 
Amendment because they improperly implied that the jury's 
imposition of a death sentence would be reviewed by an appellate 
court; (4) that the penalty-phase jury instructions violated the 
Eighth Amendment because they referred to vague and duplicative 
statutory aggravating circumstances; and (5) that the district 
court record should have been expanded to include the criminal 
record of Flamer's accomplice, Andre Deputy.  The fourth of these 
arguments was similar to an argument that was raised in Bailey v. 
Snyder, No. 93-9002, which was heard by another panel of our 
court while Flamer's appeal was under consideration by this 
panel.  Before a panel opinion was filed in either case, the full 
court voted to rehear both cases for the purpose of addressing 
the shared issue.  In this opinion, the panel that initially 
heard Flamer's appeal discusses and rejects all of Flamer's 
arguments other than the argument that was considered by the 
court in banc.  The latter issue is addressed and rejected in a 
separate opinion that is being filed simultaneously on behalf of 
the in banc court.  Therefore, the order of the district court 
denying Flamer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be 
affirmed. 
 
I. 
 The bodies of Byard and Alberta Smith, an elderly 
couple, were discovered by their 35-year old son, Arthur, on the 
morning of February 7, 1979, in their home just outside 
Harrington, Delaware.  Byard Smith had been stabbed 79 times, 
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primarily in the head and neck.  His wife, Alberta, had been 
stabbed 66 times.  Both victims had been stabbed with two knives. 
The Smiths were found on the floor of the living room, surrounded 
by blood and overturned chairs.  Byard Smith's pockets had been 
turned out and emptied.  In the kitchen, packages of frozen food 
lay strewn about the floor.  The Smiths' car and television set 
were missing. 
 Upon discovering the bodies, the Smiths' son 
immediately called the police.  Within hours, the police located 
the stolen car and identified William Henry Flamer, a nephew of 
Alberta Smith, as a possible suspect.  The police went to 
Flamer's residence, which he shared with his grandmother and his 
father, and Flamer's grandmother invited the police to search the 
home.  In Flamer's room, they discovered packages of frozen food 
similar to those found on the floor of the Smiths' kitchen.  The 
Smiths' television set and fan were discovered in the kitchen 
closet, and a blood-encrusted bayonet was found on a stand in the 
kitchen. 
 The police presented their evidence to a Justice of the 
Peace and obtained a warrant to arrest Flamer for murder in the 
first degree.  Acting on information that Flamer was in the Blue 
Moon Tavern on Route 13, the police discovered him walking near 
the tavern with two companions.  Flamer had blood on his hands 
and clothing and fresh scratches on his neck and chest.  The 
police arrested Flamer and brought his companions in for 
questioning.  One of Flamer's companions, Ellsworth Coleman, was 
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released soon thereafter.  The other man, Andre Deputy,0 was 
found to be carrying several items belonging to the Smiths, 
including two watches and a wallet containing Byard Smith's 
driver's license, automobile registration, and Social Security 
card.   
 Flamer and Deputy were questioned, at times together 
and at times separately, from 4:00 in the afternoon until 7:00 or 
8:00 that evening at Troop 5 in Bridgeville.  The men gave 
conflicting accounts, each blaming the other for the murders. 
Miranda rights were read to Flamer several times during the 
interrogation, and each time, he waived his right to an attorney. 
Flamer claimed at a later suppression hearing that he repeatedly 
asked permission to call his mother so that she could contact 
Herman Brown, Sr., their family's lawyer, to represent him. 
However, this testimony was not credited by the Delaware courts, 
which found that Flamer did not request an attorney until his 
arraignment.  See Flamer v. State ("Flamer IV"), 585 A.2d 736, 
747 (Del. 1990); Flamer v. State ("Flamer I"), 490 A.2d 104, 114 
(Del. 1983 and 1984). 
 There was a snowstorm on the day of the arrest, and the 
Harrington Justice of the Peace had closed at 4 p.m.  Rather than 
drive Flamer to Dover, which was the nearest available site for 
an arraignment, the police placed him in a cell in Troop 5 
overnight.  Without further interrogation, Flamer was brought 
                     
0See Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 2730 (1994). 
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before the Harrington Justice of the Peace in the morning for his 
initial appearance.   
 At the arraignment, Flamer was informed of the charges 
against him and was again informed of his rights.  Flamer asked 
the magistrate whether he could call his mother in order to ask 
about possible representation by Herman Brown, Sr.  The 
magistrate told him he would be able to do so but also appointed 
the Public Defender to represent him in the interim.  Flamer was 
then committed to Sussex County Correctional Institution without 
bail. 
 After the arraignment, Flamer called his mother, 
Mildred Smith, the half-sister of Alberta Smith.  Flamer's mother 
told him that Herman Brown, Sr. had retired.  Flamer arranged to 
meet his mother at Troop 5 before he was taken to the 
correctional facility, and she spoke with her son briefly at 
Troop 5 after the arraignment.  Soon after Mildred Smith's 
departure, Corporal Porter, one of the officers who had 
questioned Flamer a day earlier, addressed him as follows: 
I asked him, I said, "Do you believe in God?" 
and he said, "Yeah."  I said, "Then you got 
to believe in heaven and hell, right?"  He 
said, "Yeah."  I said, "Well, then you're 
going to burn in hell unless you get straight 
with me about what's happened today" or "what 
happened yesterday.  I want you to tell me." 
I said, "You have to clear your conscience of 
what's going on" and this is when he started 
weakening up a little bit.  He had some tears 
in his eyes and he said, "Okay, I'll talk to 
you."  That's when I took him out of the 
cell. 
Joint Appendix ("JA") at 1096.  A short time later, Flamer 
confessed.   
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 In his confession, which was given before he had 
consulted an attorney, Flamer gave the following account of the 
murders.  After a day of drinking, he and Andre Deputy went to 
the Smiths' house just before midnight in order to rob them.  Id. 
at 32.  They brought with them a bayonet, a smaller knife, and a 
shotgun, and they hid the shotgun outside the Smiths' home. 
Flamer carried the smaller knife, and Deputy concealed the 
bayonet under his coat.  In order to gain entry to the Smiths' 
home, Flamer told Alberta Smith that his grandmother had had a 
stroke and was missing.  Id. at 32.  Flamer and Deputy stood just 
inside the house speaking to the Smiths for about ten or fifteen 
minutes until Flamer, acting on a signal from Deputy, began to 
stab Byard Smith with the smaller knife, which he later threw 
away when he was stopped by the police on Route 13.  Id. at 33-
34.  After Flamer began stabbing his uncle, Deputy began to stab 
Alberta Smith with the bayonet.  At some point, Deputy also 
stabbed Byard Smith with the bayonet.  After the couple died, the 
two men searched the bodies for money and found four wallets. Id. 
at 36.  They fled in the Smiths' car, which they had loaded with 
property stolen from the house. 
 The two men drove to Flamer's home, where they stored 
some stolen items and burned three of the four wallets that they 
had taken from the Smiths.  (The fourth was recovered from Deputy 
when the men were arrested.)  Id. at 36.  Flamer left his home 
alone in the Smiths' car.  Outside Felton, Delaware, he became so 
drunk that he fell asleep.  When he awoke, the car's battery was 
dead.  Id. at 36-37.  He abandoned the car, went to the Blue Moon 
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Tavern to meet Deputy and to shoot pool and drink, and he was 
arrested a few hours later. 
 Flamer was tried before a jury in 1980 on four charges 
of murder in the first degree,0 possession of a deadly weapon 
during the commission of a felony, first-degree robbery, and 
misdemeanor theft.  Id. at 648.  Among the witnesses at the trial 
was the state medical examiner, who had performed autopsies on 
the bodies of Alberta and Byard Smith.  The medical examiner 
testified that both bodies had been stabbed with two different 
weapons, a bayonet and a smaller knife described as a kitchen 
paring knife.  Id. at 1070-72.  She testified that 19 of the 
wounds on Byard Smith were made by the bayonet, eight were from 
the paring knife, and 52 could have come from either weapon. 
Regarding Alberta Smith's wounds, the medical examiner testified 
that 25 wounds were inflicted by the bayonet, two by the paring 
knife, and 39 could have come from either weapon.  Id.  
 The jury convicted Flamer on all charges, id. at 1416-
17, and the trial then proceeded to the penalty phase.  Defense 
                     
0Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a), provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
 
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: 
 
(1)  He intentionally causes the death of another 
person; 
 
(2)  In the course of and furtherance of the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony or 
immediate flight therefrom, he recklessly causes 
the death of another person. 
 
Flamer was tried on both of these theories of first-degree murder 
for each of his two victims. 
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counsel called as witnesses the defendant, his mother, and his 
grandmother.  Defense counsel introduced into evidence the 
reports of a psychologist and psychiatrist who had examined 
Flamer.  Id. at 59-63, 65-67.  Both reports concluded that Flamer 
seemed to be of low but normal intelligence, with no symptoms of 
psychosis or other mental illness, and would be competent to 
assist in his own defense and to stand trial.  The psychiatrist's 
report diagnosed Flamer as an alcoholic, and stated that he had 
admitted being intoxicated at the time of the murders.  After 
deliberating for about two hours and twenty minutes, the jury 
returned and imposed a penalty of death for each of the murder 
convictions. 
 In February 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed 
Flamer's convictions on direct appeal, but withheld decision on 
the death sentences pending the resolution of two death-penalty 
cases before the United States Supreme Court.  Flamer I, 490 A.2d 
at 110-20.  Following the denial of Flamer's certiorari petition 
to the United States Supreme Court, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), and more 
briefing in the Delaware Supreme Court, the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed Flamer's death sentences in September 1984. Flamer 
I, 490 A.2d at 120-58.  Flamer again petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but his petition was 
denied on October 7, 1985.  474 U.S. 865 (1985).    
 In June 1986, Flamer filed a motion for state post-
conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal 
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Rule 35(a),0 asserting various claims, including ineffective 
assistance of counsel and some issues that he had raised on 
direct appeal.  This motion was denied, and Flamer appealed the 
denial to the Delaware Supreme Court.  In February 1988, the 
Delaware Supreme Court issued an order consolidating Flamer's two 
post-conviction relief petitions and remanded to the Superior 
Court for a second post-conviction hearing pursuant to its newly 
promulgated Rule 61.0  State v. Flamer ("Flamer II"), No. 216, 
                     
0Rule 35, which was superseded in 1988 by Rule 61, permitted a 
court (a) to correct an illegal sentence at any time and (b) to 
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner upon motion 
within four months after sentence was imposed.  Del. Super. Ct. 
Crim. Rule 35. 
0Rule 61 "governs the procedure on an application by a person in 
custody . . . under a sentence of this court to set aside a 
judgment of conviction on the ground that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment or on any other ground that is 
a sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon 
a criminal conviction."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(a)(1).  A 
motion for Rule 61 relief "shall specify all the grounds for 
relief which are available and of which the movant has, or, by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have knowledge." 
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(b)(2).  In addition to establishing 
routine procedures such as for the appointment of counsel and the 
timing and content of supporting briefs, Rule 61 permits the 
court to hold an evidentiary hearing or expand the record if 
necessary.  See Del. Supr. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(b)-(h). 
 
    Subsection (i) of Rule 61 establishes the procedural bars to 
relief.  Subsection (i)(1) limits the time in which to file a 
motion for postconviction relief to three years after the time 
the judgment of conviction becomes final or, "if it asserts a 
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the 
judgment is final, [to no] more than three after the right is 
first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the 
United States Supreme Court."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 
61(i)(1).  Subsection (i)(2) bars repetitive motions "unless 
consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(i)(2).  Subsection 
(i)(3) establishes "procedural default" for "[a]ny ground for 
relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction" unless there is "[c]ause for relief from 
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1987 (Del. Feb. 19, 1988).  In April 1988, Flamer filed a new 
petition for post-conviction relief expanding upon his earlier 
claims.  After supplemental briefing and an evidentiary hearing, 
the Superior Court denied Flamer's petition in June 1989.  State 
v. Flamer ("Flamer III"), Nos. IK79-11-0236-R1, -0237-R1, -0238-
R1, and -0239-R1.  (Del. Super. Ct. June 16, 1989).  This denial 
was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in December 1990. 
Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 745.  
 In addition to his state post-conviction relief 
petitions, Flamer filed a federal habeas petition in August 1987. 
In July 1989, this petition was stayed because Flamer had not yet 
exhausted his state post-conviction remedies.  Once the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Flamer's state petition, the 
federal stay was lifted.  In October 1991, Flamer filed his third 
amended petition in the district court.  In June 1993, the 
district court denied that petition.  Flamer v. Chaffinch, 827 F. 
Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1993).  Flamer then took the appeal now 
before us.   
 
II. 
                                                                  
the procedural default" and "[p]rejudice from violation of the 
movant's rights."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(i)(3). Likewise, 
subsection (i)(4) bars any claim previously adjudicated unless 
"warranted in the interest of justice."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. 
Rule 61(i)(4).  Finally, subsection (i)(5) provides that the bars 
established in subsections (i)(1)-(3) do not apply to a claim the 
court lacked jurisdiction or to "a colorable claim that there was 
a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation 
that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity 
or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction."  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(i)(5).  
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 Several of Flamer's arguments are based on the 
confession that he gave shortly after his arraignment.  Flamer 
argues that this confession should have been suppressed under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  Because the legality of the 
questioning that led to this confession is central to several of 
Flamer's claims, we will address this question first.  Our 
analysis is divided into two parts.  First, we will address 
whether the police violated Flamer's rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Then we will consider whether they violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
 
 A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
 As noted, Flamer asked for counsel at his arraignment. 
By subsequently questioning him and obtaining the confession at 
issue, Flamer contends, the police violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. Flamer advances two theories to support this 
argument.  First, he argues that his confession should have been 
suppressed under Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), because 
he did not voluntarily waive his right to an attorney after the 
arraignment.  Second, he asserts that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), should be 
applied retroactively to his case and requires the suppression of 
his confession.    
 1.  In Brewer, the defendant, a "deeply religious" 
escapee from a mental institution, 430 U.S. at 390, 392, was 
arrested on suspicion of murdering a young girl.  The police 
transported him from Davenport to Des Moines, Iowa, where he was 
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supposed to meet with his attorney.  The police had agreed that 
they would not interrogate Williams en route, but while driving 
to Des Moines, a police officer, Detective Leaming, gave what has 
come to be known as the "Christian burial speech."0  See id. at 
392.  Addressing Williams as "Reverend," the officer said that he 
felt that they should locate the girl's body so that her parents, 
whose child had been "snatched away from them on Christmas 
[E]ve," could give her a Christian burial.  430 U.S. at 392-93. 
Williams eventually led the police to the girl's body.  Id. at 
393. 
                     
0The Court recounted the speech as follows:  
 
"I want to give you something to think about 
while we're traveling down the road. . . . 
Number one, I want you to observe the weather 
conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's 
freezing, driving is very treacherous, 
visibility is poor, it's going to be dark 
early this evening.  They are predicting 
several inches of snow for tonight, and I 
feel that you yourself are the only person 
that knows where this little girl's body is, 
that you yourself have only been there once, 
and if you get a snow on top of it you 
yourself may be unable to find it.  And, 
since we will be going right past the area on 
the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could 
stop and locate the body, that the parents of 
this little girl should be entitled to a 
Christian burial for the little girl who was 
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve 
and murdered.  And I feel we should stop and 
locate it on the way in rather than waiting 
until morning and trying to come back out 
after a snow storm and possibly not being 
able to find it at all." 
 
430 U.S. at 392-93. 
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 The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
required the suppression of the evidence elicited by the 
"Christian burial speech."  Because judicial proceedings against 
Williams had begun, the Court noted, he had the right to the 
assistance of counsel.  Id. at 398.  In order to show that 
Williams had waived this right, the Court held, the state was 
required to prove "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege.'"  Id. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  The Court also stated that, 
in determining whether such a waiver had been made, it was 
necessary to "indulge in every reasonable presumption against 
waiver."  Id.  Viewing the question of waiver, not as "a question 
of historical fact, but one which . . . requires `application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found,'" id. (citations 
omitted), the Court concluded that the state had not established 
that Williams had waived his right to counsel.  The Court wrote:  
Despite Williams' express and implicit 
assertions of his right to counsel, Detective 
Leaming proceeded to elicit incriminating 
statements from Williams.  Leaming did not 
preface this effort by telling Williams that 
he had a right to the presence of a lawyer, 
and made no effort at all to ascertain 
whether Williams wished to relinquish that 
right.  The circumstances of record in this 
case thus provide no reasonable basis for 
finding that Williams waived his right to the 
assistance of counsel. 
 
 The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor 
do we, that under the circumstances of this 
case Williams could not, without notice to 
counsel, have waived his rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  It only 
held, as do we, that he did not. 
15 
Id. at 405-06 (emphasis in original).   
 In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court carefully 
applied the legal standard set out in Brewer and concluded that 
Flamer had made a valid waiver of his right to counsel.  Flamer 
I, 490 A.2d at 112-16.  The court explained: 
 [W]e see the defendant as a twenty-five 
year old male who reached the eleventh grade 
of school, a convicted felon, and one who at 
the outset informed the police he knew his 
rights.  There is no contention that he was 
not on numerous occasions given his 
constitutionally required rights as set forth 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).  Nor is 
there any contention that defendant from the 
moment of arrest until contact was made with 
him through the Public Defender's office, 
ever attempted to invoke any of the Miranda 
rights.  Instead, when confronted with the 
physical evidence seized by the police at his 
home, the blood on the coat he was wearing 
when he was arrested, the blood under his 
fingernails, and the articles belonging to 
the victim Byard Smith taken from one of his 
companions at the time of arrest, defendant 
volunteered fictitious stories of his 
complicity in the crimes while at the same 
time denying that he was guilty of killing 
anyone.  He first told the police he was home 
asleep, that Andre Deputy aroused him, and 
that he went to the murder scene to help 
Deputy take the fruits of the murder to 
defendant's house.  Defendant next told the 
police that he, Johnny Christopher and Andrew 
Deputy, had gone into the victims' home, and 
that it was Johnny who did the stabbing.  In 
the entire record of this case there appears 
to be no time except initially when he 
claimed to be home asleep, that defendant 
denies his participation in the robberies and 
murders, although throughout, including the 
taking of his recorded statement, he 
steadfastly denies actually inflicting the 
fatal wound upon either victim.  Neither is 
there any evidence in the record of this case 
that defendant was so religiously oriented 
16 
that [Corporal Porter's] speech had the 
effect upon this defendant as [the "Christian 
Burial speech"] did upon the defendant in 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 
1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). 
 
Id. at 114-15. 
  
 Reviewing the waiver question de novo, the district 
court reached the same conclusion, 827 F. Supp. at 1092-93, as do 
we.  While there are factual similarities between this case and 
Brewer, we are convinced, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that Flamer understood his right to have an 
attorney present before speaking to Corporal Porter and that he 
validly waived that right.  As noted by the state supreme court, 
Flamer had an eleventh grade education and prior experience with 
the criminal justice system.  Before arraignment, he had been 
repeatedly advised of his right to have an attorney present 
during questioning, but he had repeatedly decided to speak with 
the police without an attorney, telling a succession of different 
stories in an obvious attempt to further his own interests. After 
the arraignment but before giving the taped confession, Flamer 
was again advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), and he stated that he understood them.  See 
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-95 (1988).  Moreover, 
while Flamer's attorneys have referred to Corporal Porter's 
remarks as a modified Christian burial speech, we agree with the 
Delaware Supreme Court and the district court that there are 
significant differences between the tactics employed by the 
police in the two cases.  The police in Brewer appear to have 
17 
capitalized on Williams' unusual susceptibility to a religious 
appeal.  Williams, as noted, was a "deeply religious" man with a 
history of mental illness, and he was addressed by the police as 
"Reverend."  Here, by contrast, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Flamer was especially religious or that he suffered 
from any mental problems comparable to Williams'.  Exercising 
plenary review, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances, and applying the legal standard set out in Brewer, 
we conclude that Flamer knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel before he confessed.  
 2.  We thus turn to Flamer's argument that his post-
arraignment confession must be suppressed under Michigan v. 
Jackson.  In that case, the Supreme Court held that under the 
Sixth Amendment, "if police initiate interrogation after a 
defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, 
of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to 
counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid."  475 
U.S. at 636.  Before considering the merits of Flamer's argument, 
however, we must decide whether, as the state argues and the 
district court held, the application of Jackson to this case 
would violate the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality), and subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions.  See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 952-53 
(1994); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 879-98 (1993); Butler 
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 
U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).   
18 
 The Supreme Court has explained Teague's 
nonretroactivity principle as follows: 
 The nonretroactivity principle prevents 
a federal court from granting habeas corpus 
relief to a state prisoner based on a rule 
announced after his conviction and sentence 
became final.  See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 
502 U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 117 
L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). A threshold question in 
every habeas case, therefore, is whether the 
court is obligated to apply the Teague rule 
to the defendant's claim. . . . 
 
 "[A] case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing 
at the time the defendant's conviction became 
final."  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S., at 301, 
109 S. Ct., at 1070.  In determining whether 
a state prisoner is entitled to habeas 
relief, a federal court should apply Teague 
by proceeding in three steps.  First, the 
court must ascertain the date on which the 
defendant's conviction and sentence became 
final for Teague purposes.  Second, the court 
must "[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it 
then existed," Graham v. Collins, supra, 506 
U.S. at ____, 113 S. Ct., at 898, and 
"determine whether a state court considering 
[the defendant's] claim at the time his 
conviction became final would have felt 
compelled by existing precedent to conclude 
that the rule [he] seeks was required by the 
Constitution."  Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 
484, 488, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260, 108 L.Ed.2d 
415 (1990).  Finally, even if the court 
determines that the defendant seeks the 
benefit of a new rule, the court must decide 
whether that rule falls within one of the two 
narrow exceptions to the nonretroactivity 
principle.  See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 
___, ___ , 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2113, 124 L.Ed.2d 
306 (1993). 
Caspari, 114 S. Ct. at 953.  
 The first of these exceptions applies to decisions that 
decriminalize "`certain kinds of primary, private individual 
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conduct beyond the power of the criminal-law making authority to 
proscribe.'"  Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  The second exception, which applies to "watershed 
rules of criminal procedure," id., is generally restricted to 
decisions announcing "new procedures without which the likelihood 
of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."  Id. at 313.  
 Proceeding in accordance with the three steps outlined 
in Caspari, we first note that Flamer's conviction and sentence 
became final for Teague purposes on October 7, 1985, when the 
Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari to 
review the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court upholding his 
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal.  See Caspari, 114 
S. Ct. at 953 ("A state conviction and sentence become final for 
purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of 
direct appeal to the state court has been exhausted and the time 
for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a 
timely filed petition has been finally denied."); Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987). 
 Advancing to the second step, we note that Jackson had 
not been decided on that date.0  We must therefore survey the 
pre-Jackson legal landscape and determine whether a state court 
would have felt compelled by existing Sixth Amendment precedent 
to apply the Jackson rule even before it was embraced by the 
Supreme Court.  Addressing this question in Collins v. Zant, 892 
                     
0Jackson was decided approximately six months later, on April 1, 
1986.  See 475 U.S. at 625. 
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F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990), the 
Eleventh Circuit held that "the rule announced in Jackson 
undoubtedly constitutes a `new rule'."  Id. at 1511.  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that Jackson "imposed a new obligation 
on police (not to initiate an interrogation after a defendant has 
asserted his right to counsel under the [S]ixth [A]mendment) and 
established a bright-line rule excluding police-initiated 
statements (a result not dictated by then existing precedent)." 
Id. at 1512; accord Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1070, 1073 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 621 (1992).  See Bannister 
v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440 n.7 (8th Cir. 1992) (petitioner 
could not rely on Jackson because it was decided after his 
conviction became final); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 
171, 179-80 (1991) (stating that Jackson established "a new Sixth 
Amendment rule of no police-initiated interrogation") (emphasis 
added).  
 Flamer argues that the decision in Jackson was 
"expressly foreshadowed" by Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 
(1985).  It is clear, however, that Moulton does not support 
Flamer's position in this case.  Like Jackson, Moulton was not 
decided0 until after Flamer's conviction became final for 
retroactivity purposes.  Moreover, Jackson was not "dictated" by 
Moulton.  The holding in Moulton was quite narrow: that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel prohibits the police, after the 
initiation of judicial proceedings against a defendant, from 
                     
0Moulton was decided on December 10, 1985. 
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monitoring a conversation in which an undercover agent elicits 
statements from the defendant about the pending case.0  This 
fact-specific holding did not compel the adoption of the sweeping 
Jackson rule, and nothing in the Jackson opinion suggests that 
the Supreme Court felt that it did.  Indeed, the Jackson opinion 
did not rely heavily on Moulton and cited that case only for 
propositions that were quite peripheral to the Court's holding.0 
 Flamer next argues that the following court of appeals 
decisions dictated the Jackson rule:  Felder v. McCotter, 765 
F.2d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1111 
                     
0In Moulton, the police knew that a defendant under indictment 
was planning to meet with his codefendant, a secret government 
informant, for the purpose of discussing the pending charges and 
planning a defense.  The police therefore arranged for the 
informant to wear a body recorder, and they recorded the 
conversation.  Relying chiefly on Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964), and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), 
the Court held that the state had violated Moulton's Sixth 
Amendment rights when it arranged to record his conversations 
with the undercover agent, Colson.  "By concealing the fact that 
Colson was an agent of the State," the Court explained, "the 
police denied Moulton the opportunity to consult with counsel and 
thus denied him the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment."  474 U.S. at 177 (footnote omitted). 
0Jackson cited Moulton four times.  See 475 U.S. at 630 (citing 
Moulton, along with three other cases, for the proposition that, 
after the initiation of judicial proceedings, interrogation of 
the accused is a "critical stage" for Sixth Amendment purposes); 
id. at 632 (quoting Moulton's statement that the "Sixth Amendment 
guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal 
charges, the right to rely on counsel as a `medium' between him 
and the State."); id. (footnote omitted) (citing Moulton for the 
proposition that "the electronic surveillance of conversations 
with third parties . . . may violate the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel even though the same methods of 
investigation might have been permissible before arraignment or 
indictment"); id. at 634 (citing Moulton in support of the 
proposition that "the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation 
between the State and the individual.").  
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(1986); United States v. Ledezma-Hernandez, 729 F.2d 310, 313 
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Eagle Elk, 711 F.2d 80, 83 (8th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).  We see no merit 
in this argument.   Jackson is not a new rule within the meaning 
of Teague unless it was "dictated by precedent existing at the 
time the defendant's conviction became final."  Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 301 (emphasis in original).  A rule is not dictated by 
precedent merely because there is a "debate among reasonable 
minds" as to its applicability.  Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (1990). 
At best, the cases cited by Flamer indicate a difference of 
opinion regarding the test for determining, under the Sixth 
Amendment, whether a defendant has waived the right to the 
presence of counsel during interrogation.0 
 Flamer's final argument in support of the conclusion 
that Jackson did not announce a "new rule" is that the Delaware 
Supreme Court's own decision in Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 
591-92 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987), compelled that 
court to adopt the Jackson rule.  In Deputy, the Delaware Supreme 
                     
0Ledezma-Hernandez, 729 F.2d at 313, discussed the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel pursuant to Edwards and Miranda.  
In Felder, 765 F.2d at 1248-50, the court applied a traditional 
Brewer analysis to circumstances in which a defendant is known to 
have counsel. 
  
 Although the Eighth Circuit in Eagle Elk, 711 F.2d at 
82-83, did conclude that "the appropriate standard for reviewing 
the validity of a waiver of the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to have 
counsel present at an interrogation is essentially the same 
standard applied to waivers of the [F]ifth [A]mendment right to 
counsel where the right to counsel has been previously invoked," 
id. (footnote omitted), a single court of appeals decision cannot 
by itself "dictate" a rule subsequently articulated by the 
Supreme Court.  
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Court excluded the confession of Flamer's codefendant, Andre 
Deputy, which was obtained after Deputy's arraignment.  Deputy, 
500 A.2d at 592.  In support of its conclusion excluding Deputy's 
confession, the Delaware Supreme Court wrote: 
In the Sixth Amendment context, once the 
adversarial judicial process has begun, [the] 
defendant is entitled to the presence of 
counsel during police interrogations as a 
matter of inherent right.  Therefore, the 
only means by which waiver could be 
established, and still remain consistent with 
the Fifth Amendment waiver analysis, would 
involve some form of affirmative overt action 
by the defendant which indicated his 
willingness to talk to law enforcement 
officers. 
Id. at 591.  We see at least three major flaws in Flamer's 
argument that Deputy dictated the adoption of the Jackson rule. 
 First, it does not appear that the Delaware Supreme 
Court interprets its decision in Deputy as adopting a Jackson-
like rule.  In affirming the denial of Flamer's petition for 
postconviction relief, the Delaware Supreme Court decided, as a 
matter of state law, to adopt the Teague nonretroactivity rule 
for use in state postconviction proceedings.  See 585 A.2d at 
749.  Under this rule, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in 
Deputy was applicable to Flamer, since that decision was handed 
down before Flamer's conviction became final.  Thus, if the 
Delaware Supreme Court had felt that its own decision in Deputy 
had adopted a rule like Jackson's, the Delaware Supreme Court 
should have applied that rule in Flamer's case.  But Deputy was 
not even mentioned in this context.  Instead, the Delaware 
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Supreme Court simply held that Jackson established a new rule and 
refused to apply that rule retroactively. 
 Second, we do not interpret Deputy as a foreshadowing 
of Jackson, but as an application of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test set out in Brewer.  The court in Deputy 
distinguished the factual circumstances of Deputy's confession 
from those of Flamer's confession, id. at 591-92 n.15, in a 
manner that suggested it was applying a traditional Brewer 
analysis.  Unlike Flamer, who was brought before a magistrate on 
the morning after the day of his arrest, Deputy was interrogated 
at Troop 5 on the morning of his arrest and was given a polygraph 
before being arraigned at 2:00 P.M.  Id.  Although the magistrate 
ordered that Deputy be committed to the Sussex County 
Correctional Facility at this time, he was brought back to Troop 
5 and questioned for another eight hours.  Deputy did not respond 
when he was asked whether he wished to speak with an attorney. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the two 
confessions, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Deputy's 
confession had to be suppressed under Brewer, id. at 592, 
although it had earlier held that suppresion of Flamer's 
confession was not required.  See Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 113-115.0   
 Flamer contends that Jackson should nevertheless be 
applied retroactively because it fits within the second exception 
                     
0Furthermore, we doubt that, as Flamer seems to argue, a rule can 
be old for Teague purposes in some states but new in others. 
Certainly, Flamer has not cited any precedent for this 
proposition.  Accordingly, we hold, as has the Eleventh Circuit, 
that Jackson announced a "new rule."   
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to the Teague principle.  We disagree.  This exception is limited 
to "`watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." 
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).  As 
stated in Graham, this exception applies to that "small core of 
rules requiring `observance of those procedures that . . . are 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  113 S. Ct. at 903 
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).  Like the Eleventh Circuit, we 
do not think that the Jackson rule fits into this category but is 
instead more accurately described as a prophylactic rule that 
provides one means of protecting a constitutional right.  See 
Collins, 892 F.2d at 1512. 
 We therefore hold that Jackson may not be applied 
retroactively in this case and that Flamer is not entitled to 
relief under the Sixth Amendment. 
 
 B.   The Fifth Amendment right to counsel  
 Flamer also argues that his confession must be 
suppressed under the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and other Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence.0  In Edwards, the Court held that under the Fifth 
Amendment, once an accused has invoked the right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, the accused cannot be 
questioned further until counsel has been made available unless 
                     
0The district court held that Flamer's Fifth Amendment claim was 
procedurally barred.  See 827 F. Supp. at 1087-89.  However, the 
state's appellate brief did not advance this argument, and we 
decline to address it.  
26 
the accused initiates the conversation and knowingly and 
intelligently waives his right to have counsel present.  Id. at 
484-85.  Although Edwards was not decided until after Flamer's 
trial, Flamer's direct appeal was pending at the time of the 
decision, and therefore Edwards is applicable to his case. Flamer 
makes two separate arguments for the suppression of his 
confession under Edwards:  (1) the Edwards rule came into play 
when he allegedly asked for an attorney during custodial 
interrogation prior to his arraignment and (2) the Edwards rule 
became applicable when he asked for counsel at the time of his 
arraignment.   
 1.  In support of the first of these arguments, Flamer 
maintains that he requested an attorney during custodial 
interrogation by asking to call his mother.  The Delaware courts 
found, however, that Flamer did not ask for an attorney during 
the interrogation.  On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
wrote that "defendant did not request counsel at any stage of his 
interrogation."  Flamer I, 490 A.2d at 114.  In denying Flamer's 
petition for post-conviction relief, the Delaware Superior Court 
found that "[a]t no time prior to or during the taped statement 
did Flamer tell any police officer that he wished to have an 
attorney present before any further questioning."  Flamer III, JA 
at 2626-27.  In affirming the decision of the Superior Court, the 
Delaware Supreme Court adhered to these findings.  Flamer IV, 585 
A.2d at 747. 
 Under the federal habeas statute, this court is bound 
by factual determinations made by a state court of competent 
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jurisdiction unless one of the exceptions set out in 28 U.S.C. 
§2254(d) applies.  Flamer relies on the exception in 28 U.S.C. 
§2254(d)(8) that applies if a state court's factual determination 
is not "fairly supported by the record."  Deference is owed to 
the factual findings of a state appellate court as well as to 
those of a trial court.  Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); 
Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d Cir. 1994); Hakeem v. 
Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 768 (3d Cir. 1993).  Thus, the factual 
findings of the Delaware courts are binding on this court if they 
have fair support in the record.  We conclude that they do. 
 Flamer testified at his suppression hearing, held 
before the Delaware Superior Court in a post-conviction 
proceeding, that on several occasions prior to his confession, he 
had asked permission to make a phone call.  JA at 1861, 1862, 
1864, 1865, 1867.  However, Flamer's testimony that he asked for 
a lawyer during his interrogation was contradicted at the 
suppression hearing by several officers.  See, e.g., Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing (Oct. 29, 1979), Testimony of Officer 
Chaffinch, JA at 120 ("Q: Did he [Flamer] ever ask for a lawyer? 
A: No.  In fact, I asked him did he want to call one on a couple 
of occasions and he said no, indicating no.").  In addition, 
Flamer acknowledged at the Rule 61 evidentiary hearing that he 
thought his Miranda rights had been read to him shortly after his 
arrest.  JA at 2547.  See also Transcript of Suppression Hearing 
(Oct. 31, 1979), Testimony of Officer Callaway, JA at 342 
(stating that Flamer's rights had been read to him when he was 
arrested and again when he was first brought to Troop 5, and that 
28 
on neither of these occasions did Flamer request an attorney). In 
light of this evidence, the state courts' findings that Flamer 
did not request an attorney are fairly supported by the record 
and are thus binding.0   
   2.  Flamer also argues that he invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel at the arraignment, which occurred 
before his confession.  At the arraignment, Flamer asked 
permission to call his mother "in order to inquire about bail and 
possible representation by counsel."  Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 742. 
The magistrate told him he was free to do so "but that he would 
appoint the public defender to represent him in any event."  Id. 
Flamer and the magistrate both signed a form labeled "Application 
and Order Appointing Counsel."  See JA at 30.  The portion signed 
by Flamer stated that he "request[ed] appointment of counsel"; 
the portion signed by the magistrate stated that, "not having 
waived the appointment of counsel," the defendant would be 
represented by the public defender. Id. 
 Turning first to Flamer's request to call his mother 
"to inquire about . . . possible representation," 585 A.2d at 
742, we hold that this request was insufficient to trigger 
Edwards under the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United 
                     
0Flamer asserts that these state court findings are flawed 
because no Edwards Fifth Amendment claim was under consideration 
during the proceedings in which the factual determinations were 
made.  Whether Flamer requested an attorney is a question of 
fact, however, and the validity of the state courts' findings is 
not affected because the courts were considering a somewhat 
different legal issue when those findings were made. 
29 
States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).0  In that case, the Court held 
that Edwards applies only if a defendant "unambiguously" requests 
counsel.  Id. at 4589.  "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an 
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable 
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only 
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel," Edwards 
does not come into play.  Id.  Here, Flamer's request to 
telephone about possible representation "fail[ed] to meet the 
requisite level of clarity" that Davis demands.  Id. 
 As for Flamer's contention that Edwards was triggered 
by his request for the appointment of counsel at the arraignment, 
this argument is foreclosed by McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 
(1991).0  There, the defendant requested an attorney at his 
arraignment for an armed robbery in West Allis, Wisconsin,0 but 
during subsequent custodial interrogation regarding offenses that 
                     
0Davis may be applied retroactively despite Teague v. Lane 
because Teague only applies to a change in the law that favors 
criminal defendants.  Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2116 
(1993).  See also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844 
(1993). 
0Like Davis, McNeil may be applied retroactively because McNeil 
did not work a change in the law favoring criminal defendants.  
See supra note 14. 
0The Supreme Court was reviewing a decision of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court that answered "no" to the following question 
certified by the intermediate state appellate court: 
 
Does an accused's request for counsel at an 
initial appearance on charged offense 
constitute an invocation of his fifth 
amendment right to counsel that precludes 
police initiated interrogation on unrelated, 
uncharged offenses. 
 
See 501 U.S. at 175. 
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occurred in Caledonia, Wisconsin, he waived his Miranda rights 
without the presence of counsel and gave incriminating statements 
about the Caledonia offenses.  The Supreme Court held that 
suppression of these statements was not required under either the 
Sixth or Fifth Amendments.  The Court concluded that the Sixth 
Amendment and the rule adopted in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, did 
not apply because they are "offense specific."  Id. at 175. Thus, 
the Court held, invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not restrict police-initiated interrogation 
concerning other offenses.  Id. at 175-78.  As for the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel recognized in Miranda and Edwards, the 
Court held that the defendant had never invoked that right.  The 
Court held that the defendant's request for counsel at 
arraignment was inadequate to invoke Edwards.  Rather, the Court 
concluded, Edwards "requires, at a minimum, some statement that 
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for 
the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police.  Requesting the assistance of an 
attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction."  Id. 
at 178 (emphasis in original). 
 Under McNeil, Flamer's request for counsel at 
arraignment did not constitute an invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation. 
Pursuant to this precedent, Flamer's request cannot "reasonably 
be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance 
of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police."  501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original). 
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 In response to the state's reliance on McNeil, Flamer's 
reply brief first argues as follows: 
McNeil stands only for the proposition that 
an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
does not preclude police initiated 
interrogations related to offenses distinct 
from those with which he or she is charged. 
This holding has absolutely no applicability 
in Flamer's case. 
 
Reply Br. at 11.  This brief later states: 
 
McNeil simply stands for the proposition that 
an accused who has requested and been 
appointed an attorney at a bail hearing on 
specified charges has not invoked his right 
to have counsel present when questioned 
regarding other charges. 
 
Id. at 25. 
 
 We disagree with this interpretation of McNeil, which 
must be based on one or both of the following propositions: (a) 
that McNeil addressed only the accused's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel or (b) that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is 
offense specific.  Both of these propositions, however, are 
incorrect.  As noted, McNeil addressed both the accused's Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights.  Moreover, it is well established 
that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial 
interrogation (and the Edwards rule, which is based on this 
right) are not offense specific.  As the Supreme Court clearly 
stated in McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177 (emphasis in original): 
The Edwards rule. . . is not offense 
specific:  Once a suspect invokes the Miranda 
right to counsel for interrogation regarding 
one offense, he may not be reapproached 
regarding any offense unless counsel is 
present.  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 
(1988). 
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See also Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("The Edwards protection is not offense-specific.  Rather, a 
suspect who has requested the presence of counsel cannot be 
questioned concerning any crime, not just the one that put him in 
custody."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1122 (1995). 
 Once it is recognized that the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel and the Edwards rule are not offense-specific, it becomes 
clear that McNeil stands for the proposition that a request for 
an attorney at arraignment is, in itself, insufficient to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at subsequent custodial 
interrogation -- even if that interrogation concerns the offense 
on which the defendant was arraigned.  In McNeil, as noted, the 
defendant requested counsel at his arraignment on the West Allis 
charge.  If this request had constituted the invocation of the 
Miranda right to counsel with respect to future custodial 
interrogation concerning the West Allis offense, this request 
would have likewise restricted future custodial interrogation 
concerning any other offenses, including the Caledonia offense, 
because "[o]nce a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel 
for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be 
reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present." 
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177 (emphasis in original).  The Supreme 
Court held, however, that the Edwards rule did not apply to 
McNeil's subsequent custodial interrogation concerning the 
Caledonia offenses.  In light of the fact that the Edwards rule 
is not offense-specific, this holding cannot rest on the 
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distinction between the West Allis and Caledonia offenses. 
Rather, it must rest on the proposition that merely requesting an 
attorney at arraignment is insufficient to constitute a request 
for an attorney in connection with future custodial 
interrogation.  As the Court stated, the Edwards rule applies 
only when the suspect "ha[s] expressed" his 
wish for the particular sort of lawyerly 
assistance that is the subject of Miranda. 
Edwards, supra, at 484 (emphasis added).  It 
requires, at a minimum, some statement that 
can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of 
an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police.  Requesting the 
assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing 
does not bear that construction. 
 
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original omitted; emphasis 
added); see also, Alston, 34 F.3d at 1244-48 (Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel at custodial interrogation cannot be invoked 
anticipatorily). Consequently, we hold that Flamer's request for 
counsel at arraignment did not trigger Edwards.   
 In addition, even if Flamer's argument were not 
directly controlled by McNeil, we do not believe that his 
argument could survive Teague's nonretroactivity principle.  In 
answer to the respondent's reliance on Teague in the district 
court, Flamer's opening brief states that many of his arguments 
concerning this question "parallel [his] Jackson `new rule' 
argument," and he cross-references the portion of his brief that 
contends that Jackson was not a "new rule."  See Appellant's Br. 
at 57.  We have already concluded, however, that Jackson was a 
"new rule," and consequently this conclusion seriously undermines 
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Flamer's contention that his invocation of his right to counsel 
at arraignment prohibited any subsequent police-initiated 
questioning about any offense without counsel present.  Prior to 
Jackson, no such rule was dictated by existing precedent. Indeed, 
we are not aware of any precedent that dictates the adoption of 
such a rule even today.  Adoption of such a rule would extend 
both Jackson (by making it non-offense-specific) and Edwards (by 
making the invocation of the right to counsel at arraignment 
sufficient to trigger an accused's Fifth Amendment rights).  Such 
an extension, like Jackson, see supra pages 16 to 24, and 
Edwards, see Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1983), would 
constitute a "new rule" that could not be applied retroactively 
to Flamer's case.0  
 
III. 
 Flamer contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
because he was given constitutionally ineffective assistance by 
                     
0Although respondent expressly relied on Teague in the district 
court, their brief on appeal does not contain any such express 
reliance.  Nevertheless, we believe it is appropriate for us to 
apply Teague.  "[A] federal court may, but need not, decline to 
apply Teague if the State does not argue it." Caspari, 114 S. Ct. 
at 953; Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 788 (1994).  Here, the 
respondents expressly argued Teague in the district court in 
relation to this argument, and they vigorously argued Teague on 
appeal in relation to Flamer's Jackson argument, which Flamer 
acknowledges is closely related and is governed by essentially 
the same Teague analysis.  This case is thus quite different from 
Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994), in which 
we declined, in the exercise of our discretion, to apply Teague.  
In that case, the defense had not been raised in the district 
court and was first raised "in a supplemental brief requested by 
the court on appeal."  Id. at 7. 
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the attorney who represented him in his original trial and direct 
appeal, Dennis Reardon.  Flamer rests his argument on the 
following alleged errors of his attorney: (1) failure to seek 
suppression of the confession on Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
grounds; (2) failure to present a "unified" defense theory; (3) 
inadequate cross-examination of the medical examiner; (4) calling 
Flamer to testify; (5) failure to make a closing argument in the 
guilt phase of the trial; and (6) inadequate presentation of 
mitigating evidence and a cursory closing in the penalty phase of 
the trial.    
 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test for judging ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  First, the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was deficient.  This requires showing 
that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment."  Id. at 687.  After explaining that this 
showing requires proof that "counsel's representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.... under prevailing 
professional norms," id. at 688, the Court admonished: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential..., [because] [i]t 
is all too tempting for a defendant to 
second-guess counsel's assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all 
too easy for a court, examining counsel's 
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to 
conclude that a particular act or omission of 
counsel was unreasonable. 
 
Id. at 689.   
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 Second, the defendant must show that counsel's 
ineffectiveness was prejudicial.  Id. at 692.  In Strickland, the 
Court wrote that "when a defendant challenges a conviction, the 
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable 
doubt respecting guilt."  Id. at 695.  The Court added that "when 
a defendant challenges a death sentence. . . , the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant 
death."  Id.  More recently, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 
838, 842 (1993), the Court clarified the meaning of "prejudice" 
under the Strickland test, explaining: 
Under our decisions, a criminal defendant 
alleging prejudice must show "that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." . . .  Thus, an analysis 
focussing solely on the mere outcome 
determination, without attention to whether 
the result of the proceeding was 
fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is 
defective. 
 
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).  Applying these standards, 
we will address each of the errors alleged by Flamer. 
 
 A. Admission of Flamer's confession 
 Flamer alleges that his attorney rendered 
constitutionally deficient assistance because he failed to 
investigate the circumstances of Flamer's confession and failed 
to move to suppress the confession before trial.  As we discussed 
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above, however, admission of the confession did not violate 
Flamer's rights under the Fifth or Sixth Amendment and, in light 
of this conclusion, Flamer's ineffective assistance of counsel 
argument must fail.   
 First, it seems clear that Flamer's trial attorney did 
not render constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to 
seek relief -- suppression of the confession -- that was not 
warranted under the law as it existed before Flamer's conviction 
became final.  Second, Flamer was not prejudiced by counsel's 
performance because he would not have been entitled to 
suppression of the confession even if that relief had been 
sought.  The possibility that the trial judge might have 
erroneously ruled in Flamer's favor had a motion to suppress been 
made -- and there is nothing to suggest that the judge would have 
made such an error -- does not establish prejudice under 
Strickland.  "A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a 
lawless decisionmaker."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  As the 
Court squarely held in Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842-45, a finding 
of prejudice under Strickland cannot be predicated on the 
possibility that the defendant might have benefitted from an 
erroneous decision in his or her favor. 
 
 B.   Failure to pursue a "unified" theory of defense 
 Flamer claims that Reardon was constitutionally 
ineffective because he failed to develop or pursue a theory of 
the case that was uniform throughout the guilt and penalty phases 
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of the trial.  In response to this argument, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware wrote: 
We adopt the finding of the Superior Court 
which concluded that Flamer's claim is 
contradicted by the evidence.  Reardon's 
strategy was to raise doubt in the State's 
case against Flamer by asserting that Deputy, 
rather than Flamer, was responsible for the 
homicides. . . .  Reardon's performance was 
within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. 
 
585 A.2d at 755-56.  The district court agreed, stating: 
On the record presented, the Court concludes 
that a unified defense was presented and 
while trial counsel may not have been the 
best advocate, his performance was within the 
standards required by Strickland.  Further, 
as found by the state court, the evidence 
against Flamer even absent his confession was 
so overwhelming as to prohibit any conclusion 
of prejudice on collateral review. 
 
827 F. Supp. at 1104. 
 Whether Reardon formulated a "unified" theory is a 
question of fact, and we are therefore bound by the findings of 
the state courts, unless one of the exceptions set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) is met.  Flamer seems to suggest that the 
exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) applies, because the state 
courts' findings are not fairly supported by the record, but we 
find it unnecessary to reach this question.0  Even if Reardon 
                     
0There is clearly some support in the record for the state 
courts' findings that Reardon's strategy throughout the case 
involved the casting of blame on Deputy.  At the post-conviction 
hearing, Reardon testified that his strategy in the guilt phase 
was "[t]hat William [Flamer] didn't do it.  That any 
participation William had was at the instigation of Andre Deputy. 
I think William's statement indicated that he did do some 
stabbing but he didn't cause any death."  J.A. 2350.  Consistent 
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never formulated a "unified" theory, that in itself would not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 It seems quite obvious that a defense attorney's 
performance need not be based on some grand overarching theory in 
order to meet constitutional requirements.   "There are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.  Even the 
best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular 
client in the same way."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
689.  Perhaps the single most commonly employed defense trial 
strategy is to eschew any single pre-planned theory and to put 
the prosecution to its proof and exploit any weakness that became 
evident as the trial unfolds.0   
 Thus, even if Reardon did not have a single "unified" 
theory, it does not necessarily follow that his performance was 
deficient.  Whatever other strategy or strategies Reardon might 
                                                                  
with this approach, at the penalty phase, Reardon referred to 
Deputy's role, albeit briefly, in his opening and closing.   
 
    It is true that when Reardon was asked at the post-conviction 
hearing what his theory was at the penalty phase, he replied 
laconically that his theory was to present Flamer as "a poor 
uneducated drunk."  JA at 2350.  We are not persuaded, however, 
that this statement alone is sufficient to undermine the findings 
of the Delaware courts that Reardon's strategy at both phases of 
the trial involved the casting of blame on Deputy. 
0During the Rule 35 hearing, Reardon stated that he had discussed 
with Flamer prior to trial what they would be doing: "Basically 
what a criminal trial is all about; how it will proceed and what 
we shall do; what we shall attempt to do and that is to discredit 
during cross-examination."  JA at 1897. Later, he described his 
strategy:  "Our game plan as we expected one to be was certainly 
to pay as close attention as possible in trying to grasp ahold of 
any weakness the State might produce or leave out; mainly to try 
to demonstrate that William was, as he said, not the instigator, 
that Williams [sic] just happened to be along and got caught up 
into something that was out of his control."  Id. at 1899. 
40 
have also had in mind, the record is plainly sufficient to show 
that he attempted during the guilt phase to exploit weaknesses in 
the state's case and to cast blame on Deputy and that he sought 
during the penalty phase to elicit pity for Flamer.  In view of 
the evidence with which Reardon had to contend, such an approach 
hardly seems unreasonable. 
 At all events, we believe that it is Reardon's actual 
performance at trial, rather than his pretrial strategizing, that 
is most pertinent.  As the Supreme Court has stated, "there is 
generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless 
the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined 
the reliability of the burden of guilt."  United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 In this connection, Flamer complains that Reardon did 
not do enough to shift blame to Deputy.  We will discuss the 
penalty phase below, but with respect to the guilt phase we see 
no merit in this argument.  Flamer refers to Deputy's prior 
criminal convictions, but he does not explain how Reardon could 
have secured the admission of these convictions at the guilt 
phase.  See Del. Uniform Rule of Evid. 404(b).  He also suggests 
that Reardon should have emphasized the following facts: 
Deputy was from the city.  Flamer was the 
product of a small town.  Deputy was older 
and larger and more violent than Flamer. 
Deputy had the victims' belongings on his 
person when arrested. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 30.  In view of all of the evidence in this 
case, these facts strike us as having only a modest potential for 
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benefiting Flamer.  We are not prepared to hold that Reardon 
violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to exploit them.   
 Furthermore, even if evidence regarding Deputy could 
have been presented more effectively, we do not believe that 
Flamer was prejudiced by the failure to do so.  Flamer was 
confronted by overwhelming physical evidence connecting him to 
the crime.  In his confession, he admitted that it was he, not 
Deputy, who initiated the stabbing.  In addition, Flamer was the 
Smiths' nephew, and it was that relationship that enabled Flamer 
to talk his way into their home in order to murder them. Although 
Deputy, unlike Flamer, had a violent criminal record at the time 
of the slayings, we do not believe there is a "reasonable 
probability" under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, that the jury, 
had it been presented with more evidence about Deputy or his 
record, would have concluded that Flamer had not committed these 
murders.  
 
 C. Cross-examination of the medical examiner 
 Flamer asserts that Reardon did not cross-examine the 
medical examiner adequately in that he "failed to inquire whether 
the wounds on the victims could have been inflicted by a third 
weapon even though Flamer had mentioned . . . a third weapon in 
the taped statement."  Flamer's Br. at 32-33.  Flamer argues that 
by eliciting testimony regarding a possible third weapon, Reardon 
could have created reasonable doubt regarding Flamer's guilt on 
the intentional first-degree murder count. 
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 This claim is highly speculative.  First, although 
Flamer did confess to the police that he had disposed of another 
knife in addition to the one with which he admitted stabbing his 
uncle, JA at 33-34, Flamer did not say that this knife was 
present during the murder; nor did he ever suggest that Deputy 
had used it or even knew of its existence.  In order to create a 
reasonable doubt using a "third-knife" theory, Reardon would have 
needed to establish some probability that each of the following 
things occurred:  (1) a third knife such as the one described by 
Flamer in his confession could have produced some of the wounds 
found on the bodies of the two victims; (2) this third knife was 
brought to the Smiths' home; (3) Deputy elected to discard his 
bayonet in favor of a smaller knife in the midst of stabbing the 
two victims; and (4) Flamer did not use this knife.  Even if 
Reardon succeeded in making all this seem possible, however, he 
still would have needed to contend with the fact that Flamer's 
confession does not mention any of this in discussing the 
murder.0 
                     
0
 Q:  You used your little knife to stab Byard?  Who had 
the big knife? 
 
A:  Andre. 
 
Q: And he used it to stab who? 
 
A: He killed Aunt Alberta and then he was killing 
Byard. 
 
Q: With the big knife? 
 
A: Unhu. 
 
Q: Did you ever have the big knife? 
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 We believe that the strategy now proposed by Flamer was 
extraordinarily unlikely to succeed.  Therefore, we cannot say 
that it was constitutional error for Reardon not to pursue it. 
 
 D. Calling Flamer to testify 
 Flamer also assigns error to Reardon's decision to call 
him as a witness in his own defense.  Flamer's testimony at trial 
contradicted his prior statements, which made him appear not 
credible, he now says.  At trial, Flamer testified that Andre 
Deputy woke him up on the night of the murder and brought him to 
the Smiths' house to help steal frozen food.  JA at 1275-1276. 
Flamer testified that when he asked Deputy where the Smiths were, 
Deputy told him, "Never mind about that."  Id. at 1276.  Soon 
after, Flamer testified, he saw the dead bodies in the living 
room.  Id. at 1277-78, 1280.  Flamer's story was badly damaged on 
cross-examination.   
 At the Rule 35 hearing held in September 1986, Reardon 
testified that he felt it was important for Flamer to testify. As 
he explained: 
Through the years of criminal law, defense of 
criminals, I have had occasions on many times 
to talk to different judges of the Superior 
Court and in this case -- if my memory serves 
me correctly, present Chief Justice Christie 
                                                                  
A: Did I ever have it? 
 
Q:   The whole time you was in the house during the 
stabbing you used the small knife and he used the big 
knife. 
 
A: I used the small one. 
JA at 43. 
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in a case many, many years ago in chambers, 
and I believe it was in Wilmington, told me 
that he has really never presided over, or 
maybe one or two cases he has presided over, 
where a jury found a defendant not guilty who 
did not testify and I put that in my memory 
bank and I have used it ever since knowing 
full well that if a person doesn't testify 
they are very likely to be found guilty. 
William and I discussed it and decided that 
he should testify and he did testify. 
Id. at 1903-04.  Reardon's belief that a defendant is unlikely to 
be acquitted unless he takes the stand is one that is widely 
shared by practitioners.  Thus, as a general matter, we do not 
think it is unreasonable for a defense attorney to proceed on the 
basis of this belief, particularly in a case such as this where 
the prosecution's evidence is very strong.   
 If Flamer was harmed by his testimony, this was 
probably owing to the fact that he perjured himself.  Flamer, 
however, has never suggested that it was Reardon's idea for him 
to testify as he did, and Reardon cannot be faulted for Flamer's 
decision to testify falsely.  Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court 
seems to have concluded that Flamer's testimony departed from the 
version of the events that he had previously told Reardon.  See 
Flamer IV, 585 A.2d at 755 ("Once Flamer had testified to a 
different set of events than he had previously divulged to his 
attorney, it was too late to alter the decision to testify."). 
Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of Flamer's guilt, we 
are convinced -- as were the state supreme court, 585 A.2d at 
755, and the district court, 827 F. Supp. at 1104 -- that there 
is no reasonable probability that his testimony altered the 
verdict that the jury would have otherwise returned. 
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 E. Waiver of closing argument 
 Flamer also argues that his attorney violated the Sixth 
Amendment by failing to give a closing argument in the guilt 
phase of the trial.  In the Rule 35 post-conviction hearing, 
Reardon testified that this had been a conscious strategy on his 
part to avoid a devastating rebuttal from the prosecution.  Id. 
1906-09.  Specifically, Reardon stated that in "dozens" of cases, 
he had seen Flamer's two prosecutors give a simple and relatively 
brief closing statement followed by a lengthy rebuttal after the 
defense had closed.  Id. at 1909.  Reardon also stated that after 
the trial, one of the prosecutors "said he was prepared for two 
to three hours of rebuttal."  Id. at 1907. 
 The Delaware Superior Court accepted Reardon's 
explanation, Id. at 426, and the state Supreme Court found that 
there was adequate record support for this finding.  Flamer IV, 
585 A.2d at 754.  The state supreme court wrote: 
 The Superior Court found that Kent 
County prosecutors at the time of Flamer's 
trial were said to be routinely holding back 
their major arguments in summation until 
after the defense had given its closing 
argument to the jury.  The Superior Court 
further found that Reardon's choice to omit a 
closing argument was made after Reardon 
assessed the prosecution's opening argument 
as having little impact on the jury. When 
this assessment and the waiver of closing 
argument are viewed in light of the 
"sandbagging" practice said to be utilized 
during rebuttal by Kent County prosecutors, 
such a waiver was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. 
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Id. at 754-55. 
 Flamer argues that the state court's finding is not 
fairly supported by the record and that Reardon's testimony at 
the post-conviction hearing was concocted to justify "what would 
otherwise appear an utterly inexplicable act."  Appellant's Br. 
at 40.  We reject this argument.  For one thing, we believe that 
the state court was entitled to credit the testimony that Reardon 
gave at the post-conviction hearing.  Moreover, despite Flamer's 
attack on Reardon's credibility, the prosecutorial tactic to 
which Reardon referred is substantiated by Bailey v. State, 440 
A.2d 997 (Del. 1982).  In that case, which was prosecuted by one 
of the prosecutors who tried Flamer, the state's "opening 
summation was very brief, constituting a mere 3 1/2 pages of the 
transcript and lasting only 5 minutes."  Id. at 1000.  "The 
State's rebuttal lasted over an hour and contained the bulk of 
the State's final argument to the jury."   Id. at 1001.  For 
these reasons, we too conclude that there was adequate support in 
the record for the findings of the state courts, and therefore we 
accept their conclusion that Reardon's failure to give a closing 
argument was a conscious strategic decision.   
 Whether Reardon's decision was reasonable, however, is 
a question of law that we must decide separately.  Horton v. 
Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 592 (1992).  Our court and others have recognized that 
waiver of summation may be a sound tactic in some circumstances. 
United States ex rel. Spears v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 1024, 1026 (3d 
Cir. 1972); Virella v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 111, 118 
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(S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States ex rel. Turner v. Cuyler, 443 F. 
Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Melvin v. Laird, 365 F. Supp 511, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Had 
defense counsel sought to sum up, undoubtedly the prosecution 
would have countered his arguments.  Such an exchange of 
arguments, assuming neither counsel was much superior to the 
other, could only, by dwelling on the details of the evidence, 
have hurt the [habeas petitioner].").  Although Reardon's 
decision to forgo a closing statement may not have been wise, we 
cannot say, in light of his explanation, that the decision fell 
below Strickland's objective standard of reasonableness.   
 Furthermore, Flamer has not shown that he suffered any 
actual prejudice, for there is no reasonable probability that he 
would not have been convicted even if Reardon had presented a 
dazzling closing argument. 
 
 F. Alleged errors in penalty phase 
 Flamer asserts that Reardon made two serious errors in 
the penalty phase of the trial:  (1) he failed to investigate, 
develop, present, and argue mitigating evidence and (2) his 
closing argument was deficient.  The standards for determining 
whether counsel has been ineffective in a capital sentencing 
proceeding are identical to the standards for the guilt phase of 
the trial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.  Accordingly, the 
defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
"objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing 
professional norms," id. at 688, and that there is "a reasonable 
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probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would 
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death,"  id. at 695.  We do not 
believe that Reardon provided ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase under the Strickland standard.  
 In his opening statement, Reardon began by informing 
the jurors that if they chose not to impose the death penalty, 
Flamer would remain in prison for life without the possibility of 
parole or probation.  JA at 1480.  Reardon then asked the jurors 
to examine carefully the reports of the psychiatrist and 
psychologist, noting that these two experts were employed by the 
state and not the defense.  Id. at 1481.  Reardon foreshadowed 
the testimony of his three witnesses by stating that Flamer had 
been "a good son" and "a good grandson," whose life had been 
destroyed by alcoholism.  Finally, Reardon argued that Flamer's 
"dull normal" intelligence had rendered him particularly 
susceptible to the influence of "a strong personality" such as 
that of Andre Deputy.  Id. at 1482. 
  Reardon introduced the written reports of a 
psychiatrist and a psychologist into evidence.  Id. at 59-63, 65-
67.  Both reports concluded that Flamer was of low but normal 
intelligence, without symptoms of psychosis or other mental 
illness.  The psychiatrist diagnosed Flamer as an alcoholic and 
stated that he had admitted being intoxicated at the time of the 
murders.   
 Reardon called three penalty-phase witnesses.  Id. at 
1432-1457.  Flamer himself described his life, with particular 
49 
attention paid to his drinking problem.  He told the jury about 
his brief marriage, which had ended in divorce, and his three-
year old daughter.  He stated that he had had trouble finding 
steady employment, but that he would do odd jobs and part-time 
work whenever he had an opportunity to do so.  He also described 
the day of the murder, a day that he had spent drinking heavily 
with friends.  Next, Flamer's mother, Mildred Smith, testified. 
Although Flamer had lived with his grandmother rather than his 
mother since he was five, Mrs. Smith testified that she saw her 
son nearly every day after work.  She stated that he had been a 
good student until he quit school in the eleventh grade and began 
drinking heavily.  She also said that his personality could 
sometimes change when he was drinking.  Mrs. Smith discussed the 
failure of her son's marriage and the difficulty he had had 
finding steady work as a result of his criminal record.0 Finally, 
Reardon called Flamer's grandmother, Florence Benson, to testify.  
Mrs. Benson stated that Flamer had always been "a good boy," who 
had taken care of her by doing household chores.  Id. 1456. 
 The state presented no testimony and only one piece of 
evidence during the penalty phase -- a certified record of 
Flamer's two felony convictions for check forgery.    
 1. Flamer argues that Reardon made three significant 
errors in the development and presentation of penalty-phase 
evidence:  (1) he did not seek out Flamer's school and medical 
records;  (2) he did not call as a witness a psychiatrist or 
                     
0In 1975, Flamer was convicted of two counts of forgery. 
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psychologist to explain the reports entered into evidence;  and 
(3) he did not introduce evidence of Andre Deputy's history of 
violence in order to show that Deputy, rather than Flamer, was 
chiefly to blame for the murders.   
 With respect to Reardon's failure to seek out Flamer's 
school and medical records, we note that Flamer has not proffered 
any such evidence that he thinks would have helped to reduce his 
penalty.  Therefore, Flamer cannot claim to have been prejudiced 
by Reardon's failure to introduce such evidence.  See Zettlemoyer 
 v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 300-02 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 902 (1991).  Similarly, we do not see how calling a witness 
to explain the medical reports would have created a reasonable 
probability that the jury "would have concluded that the balance 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant 
death," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  The reports themselves are 
plainly worded, and we do not think the jury required additional 
oral testimony to explain them. 
 Flamer asserts that Reardon should have offered 
evidence regarding Andre Deputy's record of violence.  As we 
discussed in Section III.B, Flamer was not prejudiced by 
Reardon's failure to present evidence of Deputy's criminal record 
in the guilt phase of the trial.  Here, Flamer maintains that if 
the jurors had known more about Deputy, there is a reasonable 
probability that they would have concluded that Flamer, as the 
less aggressive of the two murderers, did not deserve to die.  We 
disagree.  As discussed earlier, it was Flamer, according to his 
own confession, who first stabbed Mr. Smith.  In addition, it was 
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Flamer, as the Smiths' nephew, who was able to gain entry to 
their home by telling them that his grandmother had had a stroke. 
Finally, it was Flamer who told the police that Deputy did not 
want to accompany Flamer into the Smiths' home, but had to be 
coaxed by Flamer into doing so.  JA at 32.  In light of these 
facts, we do not believe that Flamer has shown, as he must under 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, that in failing to portray Deputy 
as the instigator, Reardon's assistance fell below an "objective 
standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional 
norms," id. at 688.  Nor do we believe that there is a 
"reasonable probability" that, but for any errors of his 
attorney, the jury would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. 
Id.   
 2.  Reardon's penalty-phase summation was very brief: 
 Good afternoon, your honor.  Good 
afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I am not 
going to review the evidence with you.  You 
have heard it and you have heard it rehashed. 
I simply want to point out to you one 
important aspect. 
 
 There is a codefendant Andre Deputy. His 
fate is out of your control.  You heard the 
testimony.  You heard Mr. Flamer talk. What 
part did Andre Deputy play in this?  You must 
consider that in making your determination as 
to whether or not you are going to take 
William Henry Flamer's life. 
 
 Other than that, please -- you have 
heard his mom.  You have heard his grandmom. 
You have the medical reports. 
  
 Ladies and gentlemen, although we are 
here today talking about murder, I am simply 
going to ask you to show mercy.  Do not kill 
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William Henry Flamer simply because the law 
and the state of Delaware say you can.  There 
is a far, far greater law than anything 
conceived by this state and punished by this 
State which tells you thou shalt not kill. 
Thank you. 
JA at 1486-87.0   
 Flamer argues that this closing argument was 
constitutionally deficient, not only because of its brevity, but 
because it was "so ill-conceived that it hurt Flamer's sentencing 
prospects."  Appellant's Br. at 48.  We disagree.  Although we 
cannot say that Reardon's closing argument was especially 
persuasive or well-crafted, we also cannot say it was so poor 
that it fell below the Strickland standard for objectively 
reasonable assistance.  Furthermore, we hold that Reardon's 
failure to present a more effective summation did not prejudice 
Flamer, for we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for any errors, the jury would not have imposed a 
sentence of death.  
 Reardon was faced with several obstacles that limited 
his choices in framing a penalty-phase summation.  First, the 
prosecution had offered virtually no penalty-phase evidence of 
                     
0Though short, Reardon's closing argument in the penalty phase 
was longer than that of the prosecutor, who stated: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, my last remarks are going to be 
very brief.  That same law thou shalt not kill pertains 
to William Henry Flamer.  He had a free choice in this 
matter and the conduct that he took part in.  His free 
choice has brought him here today.  Please be fair. 
 
 All the state is asking is you consider all the 
factors in this case before your decision.  Thank you. 
 
JA at 1487. 
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its own.  Given this, it may have been tactically wise for 
Reardon not to review evidence presented in the guilt phase of 
the trial, since this might have only reminded the jury of the 
violence of the crimes.  Second, although Flamer argues that 
Reardon should have further emphasized the role of Andre Deputy, 
such an approach, as previously explained, would have involved 
certain difficulties.  See pages 41, 51, supra.  Finally and 
perhaps most importantly, Flamer had denied committing the 
murders in his testimony during the guilt phase of the trial. 
This prior testimony made it very difficult for Reardon to argue 
in the penalty phase that Flamer felt great remorse for the 
murders. 
 One court has remarked that a defense counsel's 
strategy in the sentencing phase of a capital case should be "to 
appeal to just one juror who will hold out against the death 
penalty and thereby prevent it."  McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 
518, 537 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991). 
Under the circumstances, we believe that Reardon's brief 
summation, with its plea for mercy and its suggestion that Deputy 
was more blameworthy than Flamer, was calculated to appeal to a 
sympathetic juror.  Following Reardon's lengthier opening 
statement, the testimony of Flamer, and finally, the sad 
testimony of Flamer's mother and grandmother, Reardon's summation 
in the penalty phase did not render his assistance 
constitutionally ineffective. 
 
IV. 
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 Flamer argues that a portion of the jury instructions 
in the penalty phase was unconstitutional because o expanded the 
impression that appellate review of a decision to impose a 
sentence of death would be more expansive than is actually the 
case.  In particular, Flamer claims the statutorily required jury 
instruction was improperly altered by the insertion of the word, 
"if":  "Your unanimous recommendation for the imposition of the 
death penalty, if supported by the evidence, is binding on the 
Court."  JA at 1464 (emphasis added). 
 We do not believe the inclusion of the word "if" 
changed the meaning of this jury instruction at all.  The word 
"if" or some other qualifying preposition is implicit at the 
beginning of the phrase, "supported by the evidence."  Moreover, 
elsewhere in the instructions the jury was told:  "A finding by 
the jury of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and a 
consequent recommendation of death, supported by the evidence, 
shall be binding on this Court,"  Id. at 1461.  These 
instructions were not misleading and did not violate the 
principle, set out in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 336 
(1985), that a jury instruction that inaccurately describes the 
role of a jury in meting out a death sentence is 
unconstitutional.  See also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 
(1989). 
 
V. 
 Finally, Flamer argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to expand the record to include the criminal record of 
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his codefendant Andre Deputy pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules 
Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.0 
Rule 7 permits the expansion of a record for relevant evidence. 
Flamer argues that the evidence is relevant because it bears on 
the competence of his attorney, who did not present much evidence 
of Deputy's past during the guilt and penalty phases of the 
trial.  We review the district court's decision on this question 
for abuse of discretion only.  Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 
1517 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3001 (1993); Blango v. 
Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1991); Ford v. Seabold, 841 
F.2d 677, 691 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988).   
 We do not believe the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to expand the record to include evidence 
regarding Deputy's criminal past, particularly in light of the 
fact that this evidence was available to Flamer during the state 
proceedings.0  Deputy's criminal record would not have aided the 
district court in determining whether Reardon provided 
                     
0In his brief, Flamer also argued that the court erred in 
refusing to unseal and admit into the record the results of his 
attorney's Censor Committee hearing.  At oral argument before our 
court, however, Flamer's attorney stated that the documents had 
been unsealed, that she had seen them, and that she no longer 
wished to press for their inclusion.  We therefore need not 
address whether the record should have been expanded to include 
this information. 
0Absent extraordinary circumstances, a habeas petitioner may not 
seek an evidentiary hearing on the basis of records that were 
available to him during the state court's proceedings but that he 
did not present.  Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7-12 
(1992).  Flamer, who was represented by new counsel during post-
conviction proceedings in the Delaware courts, has not shown 
cause for his failure to request that these records be included 
at these earlier proceedings.  Accord Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 
609, 613 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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ineffective assistance of counsel.  We therefore hold that it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to expand the 
record to include this material. 
 In addition, Flamer argues that the district court 
erred in refusing to expand the record to include Deputy's 
confession, which Flamer argues is relevant to the question of 
whether Flamer's own confession was admissible.  As discussed 
earlier, the circumstances surrounding Deputy's statement are 
distinguishable from those surrounding Flamer's statement. 
Moreover, the statement itself has no bearing on whether Flamer's 
confession was admissible.  Therefore, the court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to expand the record to include 
Deputy's statement.  
 
VI. 
 For the reasons stated above, the order of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
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